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Abstract: A Byzantine process is a process that –intentionally or not– behaves arbitrarily (Byzantine failures
include crash and omission failures). Considering message-passing systems, this paper presents communication and
agreement abstractions that allow non-faulty processes to correctly cooperate, despite the uncertainty created by the
net effect of asynchrony and Byzantine failures. The world is distributed. Consequently more and more applications
are distributed, and the “no Byzantine failure” assumption is no longer reasonable. Hence, due to both the development
of clouds and security requirements, such abstractions are becoming more and more important.
The aim of this paper is to be a simple and homogeneous introduction to (a) communication and agreement abstrac-
tions, and (b) algorithms that implement these abstractions, in the context of asynchronous distributed message-passing
systems where an a priori unknown subset of processes may exhibit Byzantine failures. To that end the paper presents
existing abstractions and algorithms, and new ones. In this sense the paper has a mixed “pedagogical/survey/research”
flavor.
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1 Introduction
Distributed computing Distributed computing occurs when one has to solve a problem in terms of physically dis-
tinct entities (usually called nodes, processors, processes, agents, sensors, etc.) such that each entity has only a partial
knowledge of the many parameters involved in the problem. In the following, we use the term process to denote any
computing entity. From an operational point of view this means that the processes of a distributed system need to
exchange information, and agree in some way or another, in order to cooperate to a common goal. If processes do not
cooperate, the system is no longer a distributed system. Hence, a distributed system has to provide the processes with
communication and agreement abstractions.
Understanding and designing distributed applications is not an easy task [3, 18, 25, 26, 27]. This is due to the fact
that, due its very nature, no process can capture instantaneously the global state of the application it is part of. This is
due to the fact that, as processes are geographically localized at distinct places, distributed applications have to cope
with the uncertainty created by asynchrony and failures. As a simple example, it is impossible to distinguish a crashed
process from a very slow process in an asynchronous system prone to process crashes.
As in sequential computing, a simple approach to facilitate the design of distributed applications consists in de-
signing appropriate abstractions. With such abstractions, the application designer can think about solutions to solve
problems at a higher conceptual level than the basic send/receive communication level.
Communication and agreement abstractions One of the most important communication abstractions encountered
in fault-tolerant distributed computing is Reliable Broadcast [3, 9, 10, 18, 25]. Roughly speaking, reliable broadcast
allows processes to broadcast messages, in such a way that all the non-faulty processes eventually deliver the same set
of messages, and this set includes all the messages they have broadcast plus a subset of messages broadcast by faulty
processes.
Consensus is the most important agreement abstraction of fault-tolerant distributed computing [13]. Assuming
each process proposes a value, it allows the non-faulty processes to agree on the same value, which has to satisfy some
validity condition depending on both the proposed values and the failure model [18, 26].
Byzantine failure This failure type has first been introduced in the context of synchronous distributed systems [17,
23, 26], and then investigated in the context of asynchronous distributed systems [3, 18, 25]. A process has a Byzantine
behavior when it arbitrarily deviates from its intended behavior; it then commits a Byzantine failure. Otherwise it is
non-faulty (or non-Byzantine). This bad behavior can be intentional (malicious) or simply the result of a transient
fault that altered the local state of a process, thereby modifying its behavior in an unpredictable way. Let us notice that
process crashes (unexpected halting) define a strict subset of Byzantine failures.
Content of the paper: Byzantine-tolerant broadcast abstractions This paper presents communication and agree-
ment abstractions suited to distributed systems made up of n processes, and where up to t processes may exhibit
Byzantine failures.
As far as communication is concerned, three abstractions are presented. The first two abstractions, which have
been proposed in [5, 30], ensure that a message broadcast by a non-faulty process is delivered by all the non-faulty
processes. They differ in their requirement on the messages broadcast by faulty processes. More precisely, we have
the following.
• No-duplicity broadcast (ND-broadcast). As far a message broadcast by a Byzantine process p is concerned,
ND-broadcast ensures that no two non-faulty processes deliver different messages from process p [30]. Let us
observe that this delivery rule allows a subset of non-faulty processes to deliver the same message m from the
faulty process p, while other non-faulty processes do not deliver a message from p.
• Reliable broadcast (RB-broadcast). This abstraction is stronger than the previous one. As far a message broad-
cast by a Byzantine process p is concerned, the RB-broadcast abstraction ensures that all the non-faulty pro-
cesses deliver the same message from p, or none of them delivers a message from p [5]. This is an “all-or-none”
delivery rule.
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Let us notice that, if a message is delivered from a faulty process p, there is no requirement on its content. It is only
required that the same message content be delivered to all the non-faulty processes or none of them. This is due to
the fact that, while a process is supposed to broadcast the same message to all, a Byzantine process can send distinct
messages (i.e., with different contents) to different processes.
While the previous communication abstractions are one-to-all abstractions, the third abstraction (called VB-
broadcast) is an all-to-all communication abstraction.
• Validated broadcast (VB-broadcast). Each process is assumed to broadcast a message. For a message to be
delivered by a non-faulty process, its content needs to be validated [21]. A message content is validated by its
sender as soon as it knows that at least one non-faulty process broadcast a message with the same content. As
a process does not know if it is faulty or not (e.g., while it executes correctly its algorithm, a process may crash
unexpectedly), a message content is validated by its sender as soon as it has received messages with the very
same content from (t+1) distinct processes (such a set contains at least one non-faulty process). If the message
broadcast by a process cannot be validated, the default value ⊥ is delivered instead of it.
Each of these three broadcast abstractions requires n > 3t, and are consequently resilience-optimal (with respect to the
maximal number of processes that can be faulty) [5, 25, 30]. Moreover, (as we will see) an algorithm implementing
RB-broadcast can be obtained by using a relatively simple “echo” mechanism [5, 29, 30], and an algorithm imple-
menting each of the n broadcasts of a VB-broadcast instance can be obtained from two instances the RB-broadcast
abstraction.
Content of the paper: Byzantine-tolerant agreement abstraction The most important agreement abstraction en-
countered in distributed systems prone to process failures is consensus ([3, 8, 18, 27], to cite only books). It is
well-known that consensus is impossible to solve in the basic asynchronous message-passing system model prone to
even a single process crash failure [13]. This means that solving consensus despite both asynchrony and Byzantine
processes requires to enrich the system with additional computational power. We consider here that this additional
power is given by an underlying algorithm solving the binary consensus problem (consensus instance where the only
values that can be proposed are values 0 and 1). Such an algorithm (in short BBC, for Binary Byzantine Consensus)
is described in the paper (this algorithm assumes that the processes can access an oracle called common coin, which
outputs random numbers [2, 24]).
The paper presents three multivalued Byzantine consensus algorithms (i.e., consensus algorithms where the set of
values is not restricted to the values 0 and 1, and processes can be Byzantine). These algorithms, whose constructions
are highly modular, are based on the previous broadcast abstractions and (as announced) a BBC algorithm. More
precisely, The first two multivalued Byzantine consensus algorithms are obtained from a generic algorithm whose
genericity parameter is a broadcast abstraction (namely, UB-broadcast –which captures unreliable broadcast, and RB-
broadcast). The third algorithm is based on the VB-broadcast abstraction. Interestingly, all these algorithms are
signature-free (no underlying cryptography mechanism is used).
These Byzantine consensus algorithms differ in their cost (number and size of messages they use), and their
requirement on t, from a “lower bound on t” (or resilience) point of view. The instance of the generic Byzantine con-
sensus algorithm based on UB-broadcast requires n > 5t, while its instance based on RB-broadcast requires n > 4t.
Finally, the Byzantine consensus algorithm based on VB-broadcast requires n > 3t, and is consequently resilience-
optimal.
These Byzantine consensus algorithms have a noteworthy property, namely, if the Byzantine processes collude and
propose the very same value v, while v is proposed by none of the non-faulty processes, then v cannot be decided.
This property is called intrusion-tolerance in [21]. More generally, if the most proposed value is proposed by too
few non-faulty processes, the default value ⊥ may be decided. To our knowledge, the only algorithm known so far
that considers the intrusion-tolerance property is the one described in [11] (which requires messages to carry a vector
of proposed values, which –as shown here– is not necessary). The proposed binary Byzantine consensus algorithm
BBC is also signature-free, requires t < n/3 (and is consequently optimal with respect to resilience), and its expected
number rounds is four.
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Road map The paper is made up of 9 sections. Section 2 presents the computation model. Then Section 3 presents
the broadcast abstractions which have been previously sketched, and algorithms implementing them. Section 4
presents the intrusion-tolerant Byzantine consensus problem. Then, Sections 5 and 6 present a suite of intrusion-
tolerant multivalued Byzantine consensus algorithms that differ mainly in the underlying broadcast abstraction they
use. Section 7 discusses the previous algorithms, and Section 8 presents a new binary consensus algorithm based on
random numbers and the VB-broadcast abstraction. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper. Last but not least, present-
ing existing and new (a) abstractions and (b) algorithms implementing them, the paper is self-contained, which gives
it an additional “introductory survey” flavor.
2 Computation Model
Asynchronous processes The system is made up of a finite set Π of n > 1 asynchronous sequential processes,
namely Π = {p1, . . . , pn}. “Asynchronous” means that each process proceeds at its own speed, which can vary
arbitrarily with time, and remains always unknown to the other processes.
Communication network The processes communicate by exchanging messages through an asynchronous reliable
point-to-point network. “Asynchronous” means that a message that has been sent is eventually received by its desti-
nation process, i.e., there is no bound on message transfer delays. “Reliable” means that the network does not loss,
duplicate, modify, or create messages. “Point-to-point” means that there is a bi-directional communication channel
between each pair of processes. Hence, when a process receives a message, it can identify its sender.
A process pi sends a message to a process pj by invoking the primitive “send TAG(m) to pj”, where TAG is the
type of the message and m its content. To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that a process can send messages to
itself. A process receives a message by executing the primitive “receive()”.
Failure model Up to t processes can exhibit a Byzantine behavior. A Byzantine process is a process that behaves
arbitrarily: it can crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary messages, start in an arbitrary state, perform
arbitrary state transitions, etc. Hence, a Byzantine process, which is assumed to send a message m to all the processes,
can send a message m1 to some processes, a different message m2 to another subset of processes, and no message at
all to the other processes. Moreover, Byzantine processes can collude to “pollute” the computation.
Let us notice that, as each pair of processes is connected by a channel, no Byzantine process can impersonate
another process. Moreover, it is assumed that the Byzantine processes do not control the network.
Terminology A process that exhibits a Byzantine behavior is called faulty. Otherwise, it is non-faulty. Given an
execution, C denotes the set of processes that are non-faulty in that execution, and F denotes the set of processes that
are faulty.
Multiset Distributed algorithms presented in the paper use multisets. A multiset (also called bag) differs from a set
in that it can contain several copies of the same value. Given a multiset reci, the operation #equal(v, reci) denotes
the number of occurrences of v in reci, while #differ(v, reci) denotes the number of occurrences of values different
from v in reci, namely, #differ(v, reci) = |reci| −#equal(v, reci).
Notation This process model is denoted BZ_ASn,t[∅]. In the following, this model is enriched with a constraint on
t and a specific broadcast abstraction. As an example, BZ_ASn,t[n > 5t,RB] is BZ_ASn,t[∅] in which less than n/5
processes are assumed to be faulty and processes communicate using the operations of the RB-broadcast abstraction.
Lemma 1. Let n > 3t. We have
(a) n− t > n+t
2
,
(b) any set containing more than n+t
2
distinct processes, contains at least (t+ 1) non-faulty processes, and
(c) the intersection of any two sets, each containing more than n+t
2
distinct processes, contains at least one non-faulty
process.
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Proof Proof of (a). n > 3t⇔ 2n > n+ 3t⇔ 2n− 2t > n+ t⇔ n− t > n+t
2
.
Proof of (b). We have n+t
2
≥ 4t+1
2
= 2t + 1
2
, from which it follows that any set of more than n+t
2
distinct processes
contains at least 2t+1 processes. The proof then follows from the fact that any set of 2t+1 distinct processes contains
at least t+ 1 non-faulty processes.
Proof of (c). Let Π1 and Π2 be two sets, each consisting of more than ⌈n+t2 ⌉ distinct processes. It follows that
|Π1| + |Π2| > n + t, thus |Π1 ∪ Π2| + |Π1 ∩ Π2| > n + t. Moreover, |Π1 ∪ Π2| = n − |Π \ (Π1 ∪ Π2)| and
|Π1 ∩Π2| = |C ∩Π1 ∩Π2|+ |F ∩Π1 ∩Π2|. Consequently:
n− |Π \ (Π1 ∪Π2)|+ |C ∩Π1 ∩Π2|+ |F ∩Π1 ∩Π2| > n+ t,
hence, |C ∩Π1 ∩Π2| > t+ |Π \ (Π1 ∪Π2)| − |F ∩Π1 ∩Π2|.
According to the definition of t we have:
|F| = |F \ (Π1 ∩Π2)|+ |F ∩Π1 ∩Π2| ≤ t, i.e., |F ∩Π1 ∩Π2| ≤ t− |F \ (Π1 ∩Π2)|.
Hence, |C ∩Π1 ∩Π2| > t+ |Π \ (Π1 ∪Π2)| − (t− |F \ (Π1 ∩Π2)|) ≥ 0, i.e., |C ∩Π1 ∩Π2| > 0. ✷Lemma 1
3 Broadcast Abstractions
This section defines the broadcast abstractions sketched in the Introduction, and presents algorithms implementing
each of them. The first two, ND-broadcast and RB-broadcast, are from [30] and [5], respectively. The third one
(VB-broadcast) has been introduced in [21].
All broadcast abstractions are implemented from the basic send/receive network primitives, which means that,
while they provide us with distinct abstraction levels, they do not provide processes with additional computing power.
Notation When considering the broadcast abstraction XX (where XX stands for UB, ND, RB, or VB, see below),
we say that a process “XX-broadcasts” or “XX-delivers” a message.
Unreliable broadcast The simple broadcast (UB-broadcast) is defined by a pair of operations denotedUB_broadcast()
and UB_deliver(). UB_broadcast TAG(m) is used as a shortcut for
for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n} send TAG(m) to pj end for,
and UB_deliver() is synonym with receive(). This means that a message UB-broadcast by a non-faulty process is
UB-delivered at least by all the non-faulty processes. Differently, while it is assumed to send the same message to all
the processes, a faulty process can actually send different messages to distinct processes and no message to others.
Hence the name “unreliable broadcast” (sometimes also called “best effort broadcast”).
Trivially, an invocation of UB_broadcast TAG(m) costs one communication step and O(n) messages (more pre-
cisely, n− 1 messages). The corresponding system model is denoted BZ_ASn,t[UB].
Remark When measuring the cost of a broadcast abstraction we do not take into account the size of the “data
message” that is broadcast. This is because this size is independent of the way the broadcast is implemented. We only
consider the size of the additional control information required by the corresponding broadcast implementation.
The no-duplication property The definition of each XX-broadcast abstraction includes the following no-duplication
property: a non-faulty process pi XX-delivers at most one message from any process pj . This property states that the
corresponding XX-broadcast abstraction is not allowed to create message duplicates. As this property follows trivially
from the implementation of each broadcast abstraction, it is no longer mentioned in the following.
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3.1 The no-duplicity broadcast abstraction
No-duplicity broadcast The ND-broadcast communication abstraction has been introduced by S. Toueg [30]. It is
defined by the operations ND_broadcast() and ND_deliver(), which provide the processes with a higher abstraction
level than UB-broadcast but do not add computational power (BZ_ASn,t[UB] and BZ_ASn,t[ND] have the same
computational power, namely the same power as BZ_ASn,t[∅]).
Considering an instance of ND-broadcast where ND_broadcast() is invoked by a process pi, this communication
abstraction is defined by the following properties.
• ND-Validity. If a non-faulty process ND-delivers a message from pi, then pi invoked ND-broadcast.
• ND-no-duplicity. No two non-faulty processes ND-deliver distinct messages from pi.
• ND-Termination. If the sender pi is non-faulty, all the non-faulty processes eventually ND-deliver its message.
Let us observe that, if the sender pi is faulty, it is possible that some non-faulty processes ND-deliver a message
from pi while others do not. The no-duplicity property prevents the non-faulty processes from ND-delivering different
messages from a faulty sender.
An algorithm implementing ND-broadcast Assuming t < n/3, the algorithm presented in Figure 1 (from [30])
implements the ND-broadcast abstraction. It is shown in [30] that t < n/3 is an upper bound on the model parameter
t when one has to implement ND-broadcast in an asynchronous message-passing system prone to process Byzantine
failures.
operation ND_broadcast MSG(vi) is
(01) UB_broadcast INIT(i, vi).
when INIT(j, v) is UB_delivered do
(02) if (first UB_delivery of INIT(j,−)) then UB_broadcast ECHO(i, v) end if.
when ECHO(j, v) is UB_delivered do
(03) if (ECHO(j, v) UB_delivered from more than n+t
2
different processes and MSG(j, v) not yet ND_delivered
)
(04) then ND_deliver MSG(j, v)
(05) end if.
Figure 1: An algorithm implementing ND-broadcast (t < n/3) [30]
The algorithm considers that a process is allowed to ND-broadcast only one message. Adding sequence numbers
allows processes to ND-broadcast several messages. In that case, the process identity associated with each message
has to be replaced by a pair made up of a sequence number and a process identity.
When a process pi wants to ND-broadcast a message whose content is vi, it UB-broadcasts the message INIT(i, vi)
(line 01). When a process pi receives (UB-delivers) a message INIT(j,−) for the first time, it UB-broadcasts a message
ECHO(j, v) where v is the data content of the INIT() message (line 02). If the message INIT(j, v) received is not the
first message INIT(j,−), pj is Byzantine and the message is discarded. Finally, when pi has received the same message
ECHO(j, v) from more than (n+ t)/2 processes, it locally ND-delivers MSG(j, v) (lines 03-04).
Theorem 1. The algorithm described in Figure 1 implements the ND-broadcast abstraction in the system model
BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3,UB].
Proof (See also [30].)
To prove the ND-termination property, let us consider a non-faulty process pi that ND-broadcasts the message MSG(vi).
As pi is non-faulty, the message INIT(i, vi) is received by all the non-faulty processes, which are at least n − t, and
every non-faulty process UB-broadcasts ECHO(i, vi) (line 02). Hence, each non-faulty process UB-delivers n − t
copies of ECHO(i, vi). As n − t > n+t2 (Item (a) of Lemma 1), it follows that every non-faulty process eventually
ND-delivers the message MSG(i, vi) (lines 03-04).
To prove the ND-no-duplicity property, let us assume by contradiction that two non-faulty processes pi and pj
ND-deliver different messages m1 and m2 from some process pk (i.e., m1 = MSG(k, v) and m2 = MSG(k,w), with
6
v 6= w). It follows from the predicate of line 03, that pi received ECHO(k, v) from a set of more than n+t2 distinct
processes, and pj received ECHO(k,w) from a set of more than n+t2 distinct processes. Moreover, it follows from
Item (c) of Lemma 1 that the intersection of these two sets contains a non-faulty process. But, as it is non-faulty, this
process has sent the same message ECHO() to pi and pj (line 02). Hence, m1 = m2, which contradicts the initial
assumption.
The ND-validity follows from the fact that, to be ND-delivered, a message from pj has first to be UB-delivered,
which –as the network does not create messages– implies that it has been sent. ✷Theorem 1
It is easy to see that this implementation uses two consecutive communication steps and O(n2) underlying mes-
sages (n − 1 in the first communication step, and n(n − 1) in the second one). Moreover, the size of the control
information added to a message is log2 n (sender identity).
Remark Let us notice that replacing at line 04 “more than n+t
2
different processes” by “(n− t) different processes”
leaves the algorithm correct. As n − t > n+t
2
(Item (a) of Lemma 1), it follows that using “more than n+t
2
different
processes” provides a weaker ND-delivery condition, and consequently a more efficient algorithm from message ND-
delivery point of view. As a simple numerical example, considering n = 21 and t = 2, we have n− t = 19, which is
much greater than the required value 12 (> n+t
2
= 11.5).
3.2 The reliable broadcast abstraction
Reliable broadcast The RB-broadcast abstraction has been proposed by G. Bracha [5]. It is proved in [6] that
t < n/3 is an upper bound on t when one has to implement such an abstraction. RB-broadcast provides the processes
with the operations RB_broadcast() and RB_deliver() defined by the following properties.
• RB-Validity. If a non-faulty process RB-delivers a message from px, then px invoked the operationRB_broadcast().
• RB-Uniformity. If a non-faulty process RB-delivers a message from pi (possibly faulty) then all the non-faulty
processes eventually RB-deliver the same message from pi.
• RB-Termination. If the sender is non-faulty, all the non-faulty processes eventually RB-deliver its message.
Let us observe that, from an abstraction level point of view, the RB-uniformity property is strictly stronger than
the ND-no-duplicity property: not only two non-faulty processes cannot RB-deliver different messages from a given
process, but it is no longer possible that one of them RB-delivers a message while the other does not. From a compu-
tational point of view, BZ_ASn,t[RB] and BZ_ASn,t[∅] have the same power.
An algorithm implementing RB-broadcast The algorithm presented in Figure 2, which assumes t < n/3, imple-
ments RB-broadcast. It is a simple variant of an algorithm proposed in [5]. It is presented here in an incremental way
from the previous ND-broadcast algorithm.
While the ND-broadcast algorithm of Figure 1 requires two sequential communications steps (message INIT()
followed by messages ECHO()), the implementation of RB-broadcast requires three consecutive communications steps:
message INIT(), followed by messages ECHO(), followed by messages READY().
The first five lines of the algorithm are similar to the corresponding lines of the ND-broadcast algorithm. The only
difference lies in the lines 03-04, where the ND-delivery is replaced by the UR-broadcast of the message READY(j, v).
The aim of the last step of the algorithm (lines 06-11) is to ensure that all or none of the non-faulty processes RB-
deliver the message MSG(j, v) from pj . To that end, the RB-delivery predicate requires that pi UB-delivers (2t + 1)
copies of READY(j, v), which means at least (t+ 1) copies from non-faulty processes (line 09).
Theorem 2. The algorithm described in Figure 2 implements the RB-broadcast abstraction in the system model
BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3,UB].
Proof (See also [5].)
Claim 1. If two non-faulty processes UB-broadcast the messages READY(j, v) and READY(j, w), respectively, we
have v = w.
7
operation RB_broadcast MSG(vi) is
(01) UB_broadcast INIT(i, vi).
when INIT(j, v) is UB_delivered do
(02) if (first UB_delivery of INIT(j,−)) then UB_broadcast ECHO(i, v) end if.
when ECHO(j, v) is UB_delivered do
(03) if (ECHO(j, v) UB_delivered from more than n+t
2
different processes and READY(j, v) not yet UB_broadcast
)
(04) then UB_broadcast READY(j, v)
(05) end if.
when READY(j, v) is UB_delivered do
(06) if (READY(j, v) UB_delivered from (t+ 1) different processes and READY(j, v) not yet UB_broadcast)
(07) then UB_broadcast READY(j, v)
(08) end if;
(09) if (READY(j, v) UB_delivered from (2t+ 1) different processes and MSG(j, v) not yet UB_delivered)
(10) then RB_deliver MSG(j, v)
(11) end if.
Figure 2: An algorithm implementing RB-broadcast (t < n/3) [5]
Proof of the claim. Let pi and pk be two non-faulty processes that UB-broadcast at line 04 the messages READY(j, v)
and READY(j, w), respectively. The claim follows then from the observation that pi and pj execute lines 01-05, which
implement the ND-broadcast where the UB-broadcast of READY(j,−) replaces the NB-delivery of MSG(j,−)). Con-
sequently, as no two different messages MSG(j,−) can be ND-delivered in the ND-broadcast algorithm, it follows
that no two different messages READY(j, v) and READY(j, w) can be UB-broadcast by the non-faulty processes pi
and pk. Let us finally observe that a non-faulty process that UB-broadcasts READY(j, u) at line 07 has necessarily
UB-delivered a message READY(j,−) whose UB-broadcast originated at line 04, i.e., we necessarily have u = v such
that READY(j, v) was UB-broadcast at line 04. End of the proof of the claim.
Claim 2. If two non-faulty processes RB-deliver MSG(j, v) and MSG(j, w), respectively, then v = w.
Proof of the claim. If a process RB-delivers MSG(j, v), it has RB-delivered READY(j, v) from (2t+1) processes, hence
from at least one non-faulty process. Similarly, if a process RB-delivers MSG(j, w), it has RB-delivered READY(j, w)
from at least one non-faulty process. It follows from Claim 1 that the non-faulty processes UB-broadcast the same
message READY(j,−), from which we conclude that v = w. End of the proof of the claim.
Claim 3. If a non-faulty process RB-delivers MSG(j, v), then any non-faulty process RB-delivers MSG(j, v).
Proof of the claim. If a non-faulty process RB-delivers MSG(j, v), it has received the message READY(j, v) from
(t + 1) non-faulty processes. It follows that every non-faulty process receives at least (t + 1) copies of READY(j, v)
and consequently every non-faulty process UB-broadcasts READY(j, v) at the latest at line 07 (if not previously done
at line 04). As there are at least n − t ≥ 2t + 1 non-faulty processes, each non-faulty process eventually receives at
least 2t+ 1 copies of READY(j, v) and RB-delivers MSG(j, v) (lines 09-11). End of the proof of the claim.
Claim 4. If a non-faulty process pi RB-broadcasts MSG(v), then all the non-faulty process RB-deliver MSG(i, v).
Proof of the claim. If a non-faulty process pi RB-broadcasts MSG(v), every non-faulty process receives INIT(i, v),
UB-broadcasts ECHO(i, v), and, as n − t > n+t
2
, UB-broadcast READY(i, v) (let us notice that, as t < n+t
2
, even
if they collude and UB-broadcast the same message READY(i, w) where w 6= v, the faulty processes cannot prevent
non-faulty processes from UB-broadcasting READY(i, v)). Finally, as n − t ≥ 2t + 1, all the non-faulty processes
RB-deliver MSG(i, v). End of the proof of the claim.
RB-termination follows from claim 4, while RB-uniformity follows from claim 2. RB-validity is as in Theorem 1.
✷Theorem 2
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As we have seen, this algorithm uses three consecutive communication steps and O(n2) underlying messages
(n− 1 in the first communication step, and n(n− 1) in the second and third steps). Moreover, the size of the control
information added to a message is log2 n (sender identity).
Improvement This algorithm can be improved to be more efficient with respect to asynchrony and message UB-
delivery order (i.e., to favor early RB-delivery). More precisely, we have the following.
• When a message ECHO(j, v) is UB-delivered, the following statement is added before line 03:
if
(
ECHO(j, v) UB_delivered from more than n+t
2
different processes and ECHO(j, v) not yet UB_broadcast
)
then UB_broadcast ECHO(i, v)
end if.
• When READY(j, v) is UB-delivered, the following statement is added before line 06:
if
(
READY(j, v) UB_delivered from (t+ 1) different processes and ECHO(j, v) not yet UB_broadcast
)
then UB_broadcast ECHO(i, v)
end if.
The fact that these two “if ... end if” statements leave the algorithm correct follows from the following obser-
vations. If the predicate of the first additional statement is true, it follows from Item (b) of Lemma 1 that at least
(t + 1) copies of the message ECHO(j, v) come from non-faulty processes (directly of forwarded through a path of
non-faulty-processes). Moreover, each of these processes necessarily UB-broadcast ECHO(j, v) at line 02, or in the
additional statement (after having UB-delivered the message ECHO(j, v) from more than n+t
2
different processes).
Similarly, if the predicate of the second additional statement is true, it follows that at least one copy of the message
READY(j, v) comes from a non-faulty process (directly of forwarded through a path of non-faulty-processes). More-
over, each of these messages was necessarily UB-broadcast at line 04. Hence, there is a process that UB-delivered
ECHO(j, v) from more than n+t
2
processes, i.e., due to Item (b) of Lemma 1, from at least (t+1) non-faulty processes.
3.3 The validated broadcast abstraction
Validated broadcast The VB-broadcast communication abstraction has been introduced in [21]. It is an all-to-all
communication abstraction designed to be used in the implementation of distributed agreement abstractions. VB-
broadcast integrates a notion of message validation, namely, assuming that each non-faulty process VB-broadcasts a
message, it requires that, for a message to be VB-delivered, its content v be validated; otherwise the default value ⊥
is VB-delivered instead of it. For a message with content v to be valid, a message with the same content v has to
be VB-broadcast by at least one non-faulty process. As no process knows if it is itself faulty or non-faulty (e.g., if a
process executes correctly its algorithm and then unexpectedly crashes, it is faulty), for a message m to be valid in the
presence of up to t faulty processes, messages with the same content need to be VB-broadcast by “enough” processes,
where “enough” means “at least (t + 1)”. As already indicated, if a message is not validated, the default value ⊥ is
delivered instead of it.
VB-broadcast provides the processes with two operations denoted VB_broadcast() and VB_deliver(). In a VB-
broadcast instance each non-faulty process invokes VB_broadcast() once, and VB-delivers at least (n− t) messages,
one from each non-faulty process and at most one from each faulty process. The content of a message that is VB-
delivered can be a value that has been VB-broadcast or the default value ⊥. VB-broadcast is defined by the following
properties.
• VB-Validity. As previously, this property relates the outputs (VB-delivered messages) to the inputs (VB-
broadcast messages). It is made up of two sub-properties.
– VB-Justification. Let pi be a non-faulty process that VB-delivers a message m as the value VB-broadcast
by some (faulty or non-faulty) process. If m 6= ⊥, there is at least one non-faulty process that invoked
VB_broadcast MSG(m).
– VB-Obligation. If all the non-faulty processes VB_broadcast the same value v, each non-faulty process
VB-delivers m = v from each non-faulty process.
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• VB-Uniformity. If a non-faulty process VB-delivers a message from pi (possibly faulty), all the non-faulty
processes eventually VB-deliver the same message from pi (which can be a validated non-⊥ value or the default
value ⊥).
• VB-Termination. If pi is non-faulty and VB-broadcast m, all the non-faulty processes eventually VB-deliver
the same message m′, where m′ is m or ⊥.
3.4 An algorithm implementing VB-broadcast
Assuming t < n/3, the algorithm presented in Figure 3 implements the all-to-all VB-broadcast abstraction. Let
us recall that all-to-all means here that all the non-faulty processes are assumed to invoke VB_broadcast(). This
means that a process VB-delivers at least n− t messages. This implementation uses consecutively two RB-broadcast
abstractions. It is made up of two parts.
operation VB_broadcast(vi)
(01) RB_broadcast INIT(i, vi);
(02) let reci = multiset of values RB_delivered to pi;
(03) wait until (|reci| ≥ n− t);
(04) if (#equal(vi, reci) ≥ n− 2t) then auxi ← “yes” else auxi ← “no” end if;
(05) RB_broadcast VALID(i, auxi).
for 1 ≤ j ≤ n VB-delivery background task Ti[j]:
(06) wait until (VALID(j, x) and INIT(j, v) are RB_delivered from pj
)
;
(07) if (x = “yes”) then wait (#equal(v, reci) ≥ n− 2t); d← v
(08) else wait (#differ(v, reci) ≥ t+ 1); d← ⊥
(09) end if;
(10) VB_deliver(d) at pi as the value VB-broadcast by pj .
Figure 3: VB-broadcast on top of reliable broadcast (t < n/3, code of pi)
• In the first part, a process pi first invokes RB_broadcast INIT(i, vi) and waits until it has RB-delivered messages
from at least n− t processes (lines 01-03). The values RB-delivered are deposited in a multiset denoted reci.
Then, if value vi has been RB-delivered from at least n − 2t ≥ t + 1 processes (which means that it was
RB-broadcast by at least one non-faulty process), pi validates it by assigning ”yes” to auxi. Otherwise pi sets
auxi to “no” at line 04 (in this case, vi is not validated). Then, pi issues a second RB-broadcast (line 05) to
disseminate auxi to all processes.
• The second part is made up of n tasks, which execute in the background. The task Ti[j] is associated with the
VB-delivery of the message from pj . It starts by the wait statement for both the value v RB-broadcast by pj
and the value x RB-broadcast also by pj (x indicates the validation status attached to v by its sender pj). Let
us remember that each time a message INIT(−, w) is RB-delivered to pi, the corresponding value w is added to
reci, which means that, after the predicate |reci| ≥ n− t has become true at line 03, the set reci still keeps on
being updated when new messages INIT() are RB-delivered to pi.
– If x = “yes”, as pj can be Byzantine, v has not necessarily been validated by a non-faulty process. Hence,
pi has to check it. To that end, pi waits until the predicate #equal(v, reci) ≥ n−2t becomes true (line 07).
When this predicate becomes true (if ever it does), it follows from n− 2t ≥ t+ 1 that #equal(v, reci) ≥
t+ 1. If this occurs, v is VB-delivered to pi as being the value VB-broadcast by pj .
– Similarly, if x = “no”, pi waits until reci contains more than t occurrences of values different from v (the
value RB-delivered from pj), which means that at least one non-faulty process did not validate v. When
this occurs (if ever it does, line 08), pi VB-delivers ⊥ as the value VB-broadcast by pj .
It is possible that the waiting predicate used at line 07 or line 08 never becomes satisfied. When this occurs, the
corresponding sender process pj is necessarily a faulty process. The waiting condition becomes always satisfied
when pj is a non-faulty process, and can become satisfied for some faulty senders pj .
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As two instances of RB-broadcast are used, the algorithm requires 2 × 3 = 6 communication steps, and as VB-
broadcast is an all-to-all abstraction, the algorithm uses n×O(n2) messages.
Theorem 3. The algorithm described in Figure 3 implements the validated broadcast abstraction in the system model
BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3,RB].
Proof Proof of the VB-Termination property. This property states that, if a process pi is non-faulty and VB-broadcast
m, then all the non-faulty processes eventually VB-deliver the same message m′ from pi, where m′ is m or ⊥.
As there are at least n− t non-faulty processes, and each non-faulty process VB-broadcasts a value, we eventually
have |recj | ≥ n − t at every non-faulty process pj . Hence, no non-faulty process blocks forever at line 03. It
consequently RB-broadcasts a message VALID() at line 05. We now consider two cases.
• The non-faulty process pi RB-broadcasts VALID(i,“yes”). It follows from line 07 that (a) d = vi (the value VB-
broadcast by pi), and (b) reci contains at least n− 2t copies of v = vi, i.e., pi has RB-delivered messages INIT
(−, v) from n − 2t different processes. Due to the RB-Uniformity of RB-broadcast, each non-faulty process
pj eventually RB-delivers both these n− 2t messages INIT (−, v), and the message VALID(i,“yes”) from pi. It
follows that pj eventually VB-delivers v = vi at line 07.
• The non-faulty process pi RB-broadcasts VALID(i,“no”). It follows from the termination property of RB-
broadcast that each non-faulty process pj RB-delivers VALID(i,“no”) from pi. Moreover, it follows from the
test line 04 that, if pi RB-broadcast VALID(i,“no”), that, among the n− t values in reci, less then n− 2t values
are equal to vi, i.e. more than t values are different from vi. Hence due to the RB-Uniformity property of
RB-broadcast, every non-faulty process pj eventually RB-delivers at least t + 1 values different from vi, and
consequently VB-delivers ⊥ at line 08.
Proof of the VB-Uniformity property. This property states that, if a non-faulty process pi VB-delivers a message
from pj –possibly faulty–, then all the non-faulty processes eventually VB-deliver the same message from pj .
Let pi be a non-faulty process that VB-delivers a value d from pj . This means that pi has previously RB-delivered
a message INIT(j, v) and a message VALID(j, x) from pj at the latest in its delivery task Ti[j]. The proof of this
property is very similar to the previous one.
It follows that pi has RB-delivered (1) a message VALID(j, x) and a message INIT(j, v) from pj , and (2) a multiset
reci of values that satisfies some property (depending on the value of x). As pi is non-faulty, it follows from the RB-
Uniformity property of RB-broadcast, that every non-faulty process pk eventually RB-delivers (1) both VALID(j, x)
and INIT(j, v), and (2) a multiset reck of values such that eventually reck = reci. As the value x RB-delivered to pi
and pk is the same, it follows from the waiting condition (used at line 07 or line 08, according to the value of x) that
pk eventually VB-delivers at line 10 the same value d as pi.
Proof of the VB-Obligation property. This property states that if all the non-faulty process VB-broadcast the same
value v, each of them VB-delivers v as the value VB-broadcast by each of them.
As each non-faulty process pj VB-broadcasts the value v, it follows that it RB-broadcasts INIT(j, v) (line 05).
Consequently this value v eventually appears at least (n−2t) times in the multiset reci of every non-faulty process pi.
Hence, each non-faulty process pi VB-broadcasts the message VALID(i,”yes”) and (from the RB-termination prop-
erty) each non-faulty process pk RB-delivers the message VALID(i,”yes”). Consequently, each non-faulty process pk
executes the task Tk[i] with respect to each non-faulty process pi (and possibly also with respect to faulty processes).
The waiting predicate of line 07 is then eventually satisfied at pk, and this is true for value v only. When this occurs,
each non-faulty process pk VB-delivers v as the value VB-broadcast by the non-faulty process pi.
Proof of the VB-Justification property. This property states that, if the VB-delivered value m is such that m 6= ⊥,
there is at least one non-faulty process that invoked VB_broadcast MSG(m).
If m 6= ⊥ is VB-delivered by a non-faulty process pi as the value VB-broadcast by pj , this value appears at least
(n− 2t) times in reci (waiting predicate of line 07). As n− 2t ≥ t+ 1, it follows that at least one non-faulty process
has VB-broadcast m. ✷Theorem 3
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3.5 Comparing the broadcast abstractions
Table 1 compares the costs of the three previous broadcast abstractions. Considering one broadcast instance, the
second column indicates the broadcast type (1-to-n or n-to-n). The third column indicates the number of (sequential)
communication steps required by the corresponding algorithms. The fourth column presents the size of the additional
control information that each message has to carry (the log2 n comes from the fact that the identity of the process that
broadcasts a message has to be sent together with it when forwarded by another process). The fifth column indicates
the number of implementation messages used by the corresponding algorithms. Finally, the last column states the
constraint on t required to implement the corresponding abstraction in BZ_ASn,t[∅].
broadcast x-to-y type # comm. steps message size # msgs constraint on t
UB 1-to-n 1 constant n− 1 n > t
ND 1-to-n 2 log2 n O(n2) n > 3t
RB 1-to-n 3 log2 n O(n2) n > 3t
VB n-to-n 6 log2 n n×O(n2) n > 3t
Table 1: Cost and constraint on the different broadcast abstractions
4 Intrusion-Tolerant Byzantine Consensus and Underlying Enriched Model
4.1 Byzantine consensus
Byzantine consensus The consensus problem has been informally stated in the Introduction. Assuming that at least
each non-faulty process proposes a value, each of them has to decide on a value in such a way that the following
properties are satisfied.
• C-Termination. Every non-faulty process eventually decides on a value.
• C-Agreement. No two non-faulty processes decide on different values.
• C-Obligation (validity). If all the non-faulty processes propose the same value v, then v is decided.
Intrusion-tolerant Byzantine (ITB) consensus In Byzantine consensus, if not all the non-faulty processes propose
the same value, any value can be decided. As indicated in the Introduction, we are interested here in a more con-
strained version of the consensus problem in which a value proposed only by faulty processes cannot be decided. This
consensus problem instance is defined by the C-Termination, C-Agreement and C-Obligation properties stated above
plus the following C-Non-intrusion property (which is a validity property).
• C-Non-intrusion (validity). A decided value is a value proposed by a non-faulty process or ⊥.
The fact that no value proposed only by faulty processes can be decided gives its name (namely intrusion-tolerant) to
that consensus problem instance.
Binary consensus The consensus is binary when only two values (e.g., 0 and 1) can be proposed. When more than
two values can be proposed, consensus is multivalued.
Interestingly, the fact that only two values can be proposed to a binary Byzantine consensus, combined with the
C-obligation property, provides the binary consensus problem with the following interesting property (which is no
longer true for multivalued consensus).
Property 1. The binary Byzantine consensus problem is such that: C-obligation ⇒ C-non-intrusion ∧ (⊥ is never
decided).
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4.2 Enriched model for multivalued ITB consensus
Additional power is required It is well-known that Byzantine consensus cannot be solved when t ≤ n/3 in syn-
chronous systems [17, 23]. Moreover, consensus cannot be solved in asynchronous systems as soon as even only one
process may crash [13], which means that Byzantine consensus cannot be solved either as soon as one process can be
faulty. Said another way, additional computational power is needed if one wants to solve Byzantine consensus in an
asynchronous system.
Such an additional power can be obtained by randomization (e.g., [4, 11, 15, 24, 30]), failure detectors (e.g.,
[14, 16, 20]), additional synchrony assumptions (e.g., [12, 19]), or even the assumption that there is a binary consensus
algorithm that is given for free by the underlying system (e.g., [7, 11, 22, 28, 31]).
Enriched model for multivalued ITB consensus In the following, BBC denotes any algorithm that solves the
Byzantine binary consensus problem. (Such algorithms are described in [5, 11, 15, 30]. A novel BBC algorithm
based on the VB-broadcast abstraction is presented in Section 8). Let BZ_ASn,t[XX,BBC] denote the system model
BZ_ASn,t[∅] enriched with BBC (which adds computational power) and the broadcast abstraction XX (which pro-
vides a higher abstraction level than send/receive).
As announced in the Introduction, the aim is to design a generic multivalued ITB consensus algorithm on top of
BZ_ASn,t[XX,BBC].
5 Generic Consensus Based on the UB or ND-Broadcast Abstractions
This section presents a generic multivalued ITB consensus algorithm that can be instantiated with UB-broadcast or
ND-broadcast. It uses two rounds for each process to compute a value it proposes to the underlying binary consensus.
The instantiation based on UB-broadcast requires n > 5t, while the one based on ND-broadcast requires n > 4t.
5.1 Principles and description of the algorithm
The generic algorithm is presented in Figure 4. A process invokes propose(vi) where vi is the value it proposes to the
consensus. It terminates when it executes the statement return() (line 14), which supplies it with the decided value.
(In order to prevent confusion, the operation of the underlying binary consensus is denoted bin_propose().)
operation propose(vi)
(01) XX_broadcast EST1(vi);
(02) wait until (EST1(−) messages XX_delivered from (n− t) processes);
(03) let rec1i = multiset of values XX_delivered and carried by EST1 messages;
(04) if (∃v : #equal(v, rec1i) ≥ n− 2t) then auxi ← v else auxi ← ⊥ end if;
(05) XX_broadcast EST2(auxi);
(06) wait until (EST2(−) messages XX_delivered from (n− t) processes);
(07) let rec2i = multiset of values XX_delivered and carried by EST2 messages;
(08) if (∃v 6= ⊥ : #equal(v, rec2i) ≥ n− 2t) then bpi ← 1 else bpi ← 0 end if;
(09) if (∃v 6= ⊥ : v ∈ rec2i) then let v = most frequent non-⊥ value in rec2i;
(10) resi ← v
(11) else resi ← ⊥
(12) end if;
(13) b_deci ← bin_propose(bpi); % underlying BBC algorithm %
(14) if (b_deci = 1) then return(resi) else return(⊥) end if.
Figure 4: Generic algorithm for intrusion-tolerant Byzantine multivalued consensus algorithm
In order to reduce the Byzantine consensus problem to its binary counterpart to benefit from BBC, the processes
first exchange the values they propose. If a process sees that a value v has been proposed “enough” times, it proposes 1
to BBC, otherwise it proposes 0. Then, if 1 is decided from BBC, the non-faulty processes decide the value v that has
been proposed “enough” times, otherwise they decide ⊥ (lines 09-14). For this to work, If a process pi proposes 1 to
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the underlying BBC algorithm because it has seen enough copies of a value v, it must be sure that any other non-faulty
process pj will be able to decide v even if it has proposed 0 to BBC (because it has not seen enough copies of v).
This issue is solved by two asynchronous rounds executed before invoking the underlying BBC algorithm (lines
01-12). The messages of the first round and the second round are tagged EST1 and EST2, respectively. Interestingly,
we will state below two properties PR1 and PR2 that are the same as the properties used in [20, 25] to solve consensus
on top of an asynchronous system enriched with any of Chandra and Toueg’s failure detectors [10].
It is important to remark that, at the abstraction level of the consensus algorithm, a message carries only a tag
(EST1 or EST2) and a proposed value or ⊥. Hence, considering that proposed values have constant size, the size of the
messages used by the algorithm is O(1) (no message is required to carry array-like data structures whose size would
depend on n).
5.2 First additional round
The aim of this round (lines 01-04) is to direct each process pi to define a “new” proposed value auxi in such a way
that the values auxi of the non-faulty processes satisfy the following property (Lemma 2):
PR1 ≡
[
∀i, j ∈ C :
(
(auxi 6= ⊥) ∧ (auxj 6= ⊥)
)
⇒
(auxi = auxj = v) ∧ (v has been proposed by a non-faulty process)
]
.
Hence this round replaces (for the non-faulty processes) the set of values they propose by a non-empty set including
at most two values (namely, a value v proposed by a non-faulty process and ⊥).
From an operational point of view, this is obtained as follows. The processes first exchange (with the help of the
underlying broadcast facility) the values they propose (lines 01-02). The values delivered at pi are kept in the multiset
rec1i. Then, if there is a value v in rec1i such that #equal(v, rec1i) ≥ n − 2t, v is assigned to auxi. Otherwise
auxi = ⊥.
5.3 Second additional round
The aim of the second round (lines 05-12) is to establish the following property denoted PR2 (Lemma 3) in order
the result of the underlying BBC algorithm can be safely exploited as described previously (lines 13-14). The local
variable bpi contains the value proposed by pi to the underlying BBC algorithm, and resj contains the non-⊥ value
that any non-faulty process pj will decide if the default value ⊥ is not decided.
PR2 ≡
[
(∃i ∈ C : bpi = 1)⇒ (∀j ∈ C : resj = resi = v 6= ⊥)
]
.
Operationally, this is obtained as follows. With the help of the underlying broadcast abstraction the non-faulty
processes exchange the values of their auxi variables. The values delivered at pi are saved in the multiset rec2i. (This
multiset contains n − t values, and, due to PR1, those can be ⊥, a non-⊥ value v proposed by a non-faulty process,
and at most t arbitrary values sent by faulty processes.)
If there is a non-⊥ value v such that #equal(v, rec2i) ≥ n − 2t, pi proposes bpi = 1 to the binary consensus
BBC. Otherwise, pi has not seen enough copies of a value v 6= ⊥ and consequently proposes bpi = 0. In all cases,
pi defines resi as the most frequent non-⊥ value it has received. As the proof of Lemma 3 will show, if a non-faulty
process pi invokes bin_propose(1), each non-faulty process will have the same non-⊥ value in its local variable resj .
5.4 Proof of the algorithm
Let us recall that C denotes the set of processes that are non-faulty in the considered execution.
Lemma 2. PR1 holds in both system models BZ_ASn,t[t < n/5,UB] and BZ_ASn,t[t < n/4,ND].
Proof Let pi and pj be two non-faulty processes such that auxi = v 6= ⊥. We consider separately each case stated in
the lemma assumption.
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• Case 1: t < n/5 and the non-faulty processes use the UB-broadcast abstraction.
As auxi = v 6= ⊥, it follows that #equal(v, rec1i) ≥ n−2t (line 04). Hence, due to the UB-broadcast, among
the n − t messages it has UB-delivered (from different processes), at least n − 2t are EST1(v). As at most t
processes are faulty, it follows that at least n− 3t non-faulty processes have UB-broadcast a message EST1(v).
Consequently, at most n− (n− 3t) = 3t processes may send w 6= v to pj . As 3t < n− 2t, pj never assigns w
to auxj .
Finally, the proof that v has been proposed by a non-faulty process follows from the observation that v has been
sent by at least n− 2t > t non-faulty processes.
• Case 2: t < n/4 and the non-faulty processes use the ND-broadcast.
In that case, pi has ND-delivered at least (n − 2t) messages EST1(v), from different processes, and pj has
ND-delivered at least n − 2t messages EST1(w) from different processes. As n > 4t, it follows that there is a
process px such that pi has ND-delivered EST1(v) from px and pj has ND-delivered EST1(w) from px. But, be
px faulty or non-faulty, this is impossible due to the ND-duplicity property (if a non-faulty process ND-delivers
a value from a process px, any other non-faulty process either ND-delivers the same value from px or does not
ND-deliver a message from px). It follows that we have v = w.
Finally, similarly to the previous case, the proof that v has been proposed by a non-faulty process follows from
the observation that v has been ND-broadcast by at least n− 2t > t non-faulty processes.
✷Lemma 2
Lemma 3. PR2 holds in both system models BZ_ASn,t[t < n/5,UB] and BZ_ASn,t[t < n/4,ND].
Proof Let pi be a process such that bpi = 1. It follows from lines 06-08 that the multiset rec2i contains n− t values
(including ⊥). From line 08 we also have (bpi = 1) ⇒
(
∃v 6= ⊥ : #equal(v, rec2i) ≥ n − 2t
)
, from which
we conclude that pi has delivered at least n − 2t messages EST2(v). Moreover, due to Lemma 2, the values sent by
non-faulty processes are only v or ⊥. Let us consider separately each case stated in the lemma assumption.
• Case 1: t < n/5 and the non-faulty processes use UB-broadcast.
As there are at most t faulty processes, at most t messages EST2(v) UB-delivered by pi are from faulty pro-
cesses. Consequently, at least n − 3t non-faulty processes have UB-broadcast EST2(v) to pj . As pj waits
for n − t messages, it can miss at most t messages EST2(v) from non-faulty processes (this is because, in the
worst case, the t messages missed by pj are from non-faulty processes that UB-broadcast EST2(v)). Con-
sequently, pj UB-delivers at least n − 4t messages EST2(v) from non-faulty processes. As n > 5t, we
have #equal(v, rec2j) > n − 4t ≥ t + 1. Let us finally notice that, as at most t processes are faulty, pj
UB-delivers at most t messages EST2(−) carrying values different from v and ⊥. Hence, ∀w 6= ⊥ we have
#equal(v, rec2j) > t ≥ #equal(w, rec2j), which proves the lemma.
• Case 2: t < n/4 and the non-faulty processes use ND-broadcast.
In that case, due to ND-broadcast, no two non-faulty processes can ND-deliver different values from the same
faulty process. The worst case is then when (a) t processes are faulty and ND-broadcast the same value w /∈
{v,⊥}, and (b) pj ND-delivers these t messages EST2(w). We trivially have t ≥ #equal(w, rec2j). On
another side, as #equal(v, rec2i) ≥ n − 2t ≥ 2t + 1, and pj misses at most t messages EST2(v), we have
#equal(v, rec2j) ≥ t + 1. Hence, we have #equal(v, rec2j) > t ≥ #equal(w, rec2j), which concludes the
proof of the lemma.
✷Lemma 3
Theorem 4. The algorithm described in Figure 4 solves the ITB multivalued consensus problem in bothBZ_ASn,t[t <
n/5,UB,BBC] and BZ_ASn,t[t < n/4,ND,BBC].
Proof Proof of the C-Termination property (every non-faulty process decides). As at most t processes are faulty, no
non-faulty process blocks forever at line 02 or line 06. Finally, due to the C-termination property of the underlying
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binary consensus algorithm BBC, every non-faulty process decides.
Proof of the C-Agreement property (no two non-faulty processes decide differently). If BBC returns 0, all the non-
faulty processes decide ⊥, and C-Agreement trivially follows. Hence, let us consider that BBC returns 1. It then
follows from Property 1 of BBC that there is a non-faulty process pi such that bpi = 1. Hence, due to Lemma 3, any
non-faulty process pj is such that resj = v, and all the non-faulty processes decide v.
Proof of the C-Obligation property (if all the non-faulty processes propose the same value, that value is decided).
Let us assume that all the non-faulty processes propose value v. Let pi be any non-faulty process. We then have
#equal(v, rec1i) ≥ n − 2t at each non-faulty process pi, and consequently each of the (at least) n − t non-faulty
process sends EST2(v) (line 05). So, each non-faulty process delivers at least n − 2t of these messages and we have
#equal(v, rec2i) ≥ n− 2t. Hence, any non-faulty pi is such that bpi = 1 and sets resi to v. Due to the C-obligation
property of the underlying BBC algorithm, value 1 is decided, and consequently all the non-faulty processes decide v.
Proof of the C-Non-intrusion property (a non-⊥ value proposed only by faulty processes cannot be decided). If a
non-⊥ value is decided, it follows from Property 1 of the underlying BBC that a non-faulty process pi has proposed
1. Hence, we have bpi = 1, and consequently #equal(v, rec2i) ≥ n − 2t. As there are at most t faulty processes, it
follows that non-faulty processes have broadcast EST2(v), which in turn implies that n− 2t processes have broadcast
EST1(v), i.e., at least n − 3t ≥ t + 1 processes have broadcast EST1(v), from which we finally conclude that v has
been proposed by non-faulty processes. ✷Theorem 4
6 A Consensus Algorithm Based on the VB-Broadcast Abstraction
This section presents an intrusion-tolerant Byzantine consensus algorithm based on the VB-broadcast abstraction. This
algorithm requires t < n/3 and has consequently an optimal resilience. It requires a single round (instead of two as in
Figure 4). As it is based on VB-broadcast, this round requires six communication steps.
Principles and description of the algorithm The algorithm is presented in Figure 5. After it has VB-broadcast its
value, a process pi waits for EST() messages from n−t processes and deposits the corresponding values in the multiset
reci. Then, pi checks if (1) (in addition to ⊥) it has VB-delivered exactly one non-⊥ value v, and (2) that value has
been VB-broadcast by at least n − 2t processes (line 04). If there is such a value, pi proposes 1 to the underlying
binary consensus, otherwise it proposes 0 (line 05).
Finally, pi decides ⊥ if the underlying binary consensus BBC returns 0 (lines 11). Differently, if 1 is returned, pi
waits until it has VB-delivered (n − 2t) messages EST() carrying the very same value v (line 09) and then decides
that value (line 10). Let us notice that, among these (n − 2t) messages, some have been already VB-delivered at
line 02. The important point is (as shown in the proof) that the net effect of (a) the VB-broadcast, (b) the predicate
used at line 04, and (c) the predicate used in the wait statement at line 09, ensures that if a non-faulty process invokes
bin_propose(1), then all the non-faulty processes eventually VB-deliver (n − 2t) times the very same value v and
decide it.
On the predicate “reci contains a single non-⊥ value” used at line 04 The aim of this predicate is to ensure that, if
bpi = bpj = 1 (where pi and pj are two non-faulty processes), then the multisets reci and recj contain only instances
of the very same value v (plus possibly instances of ⊥).
To motivate this predicate, let us consider that the predicate of line 04 is restricted to its first part, namely,
“∃ v : #equal(v, reci) ≥ n − 2t”. Assuming n = 10 and t = 3, let us consider the case where, at line 01,
four processes VB-broadcast the message EST(v), while six processes VB-broadcast the message EST(w). Moreover,
let us consider the following execution:
• On the one side, pi VB-delivers n − t = 7 messages EST(), four that carry v and three that carry w. As
#equal(v, reci) = 4 ≥ n − 2t = 4, the restricted predicate is satisfied for v, and consequently pi assigns 1 to
bpi.
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• On the other side, pj VB-delivers n − t = 7 messages EST(), four that carry w and three that carry v. As
#equal(w, reci) = 4 ≥ n− 2t = 4, the restricted predicate is satisfied for w, and consequently pj assigns 1 to
bpi.
It follows that we have bpi = bpj = 1 (pi and pj being non-faulty processes), while v is the value that will be decided
by pi if the underlying BBC algorithm returns 1, and the value decided by pj will be w 6= v. It is easy to see that the
second part of predicate of line 04 prevents this bad scenario from occurring.
operation propose(vi)
(01) VB_broadcast EST(vi);
(02) wait until (EST(−) messages VB_delivered from (n− t) processes);
(03) let reci = multiset of the values v such that EST(v) is VB_delivered to pi;
(04) if (∃v 6= ⊥ : #equal(v, reci) ≥ n− 2t) ∧ (reci contains a single non-⊥ value)
(05) then bpi ← 1 else bpi ← 0
(06) end if;
(07) b_deci ← bin_propose(bpi); % underlying BBC consensus %
(08) if (b_deci = 1)
(09) then wait until (∃v 6= ⊥ such that EST(v) VB_delivered from (n− 2t) processes);
(10) return(v)
(11) else return(⊥)
(12) end if.
Figure 5: Intrusion-tolerant Byzantine consensus algorithm based on VB-broadcast (t < n/3)
Theorem 5. The algorithm described in Figure 5 solves the ITB multivalued consensus problem in the system model
BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3,VB,BBC].
Proof Proof of the C-Termination property (every non-faulty process decides). If the underlying BBC algorithm re-
turns 0, termination is trivial. Hence, let us consider that 1 is returned. Due to Property 1 of BBC, there is a non-faulty
process pi such that bpi = 1, which in turn implies that, at line 02, pi has received at least (n− 2t) messages EST(v).
Due to the VB-Uniformity property of VB-broadcast, any non-faulty process eventually VB-delivers these (n − 2t)
messages EST(v). Hence, no non-faulty process pj blocks forever at line 09, which concludes the proof of the termi-
nation property.
Proof the C-Agreement property (no two non-faulty processes decide differently). The proof is similar to the previous
one. If BBC returns 0, agreement is trivial. If 1 is returned, it follows from n − 2t > t and the fact that –at any non-
faulty process pi– there is no w 6= v such that w ∈ reci (second predicate of line 04), that the value v the processes
are waiting for at line 09 is unique, which completes the proof of the agreement property.
Proof of the C-Obligation property (if all the non-faulty processes propose the same value, that value is decided). If
all the non-faulty processes propose the same value v, it follows from the VB-Obligation property that v is neces-
sarily validated, and from the VB-Termination property that all the non-faulty processes VB-deliver at least (n − 2t)
messages EST(v). Moreover, as n − 2t > t, there is a single such value v. Due to VB-Justification property, a value
VB-broadcast only by faulty processes cannot be validated and consequently no non-faulty process can VB-deliver
it. This means that only v, ⊥ or nothing at all can be VB-delivered from a faulty process. It follows that, at each
non-faulty process pi, the predicate of line 04 is satisfied and pi proposes bpi = 1. Due to the C-Obligation property
of BBC, they all decide 1 and consequently decide the same proposed value v.
Proof of the C-Non-intrusion property (a non-⊥ value proposed only by faulty processes cannot be decided). If a
value w is proposed only by faulty processes, it follows from the VB-Justification property that no non-faulty process
pi VB-delivers it. If the underlying BBC algorithm returns 0, w is not decided. If BBC returns 1, we have seen in the
proof of the C-Agreement property that the processes decide a value v such that at least (n − 2t) messages EST(v)
have been VB-delivered. As n− 2t > t, it follows that w cannot be decided. ✷Theorem 5
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7 Discussion
7.1 An interesting property of the previous ITB consensus algorithms
Let v be the value most proposed by the non-faulty processes (if several values are equally most proposed, v is any of
them), and let #(v) be the number of non-faulty processes that propose it. The previous algorithms have the following
noteworthy property. (This follows from Lemma 2, Lemma 3 and Theorem 4 for the ITB instances obtained from the
generic algorithm described in Figure 4, and from Theorem 5 for the VB-based algorithm described in Figure 5.)
• If #(v) ≥ n− t, then v is always decided by the non-faulty processes (let us observe that, in that case, there is
a single most proposed value).
• If #(v) < n− 2t, then ⊥ is always decided by the non-faulty processes.
• If n − 2t ≤ #(v) < n − t, then which value (v or ⊥) is decided by the non-faulty processes depends on both
the behavior of Byzantine processes and the asynchrony pattern.
v is decided⊥ or v is decided
n1
n− 2t− 1 t + 1t
⊥ is decided
deterministic:non-deterministic:
1 ≤ #(v) < n− 2t n− t ≤ #(v) ≤ n
n− 2t ≤ #(v) < n− t
n− tn− 2t
deterministic:
Figure 6: Deterministic vs non-deterministic scenarios
Let us consider an omniscient observer that would know which are the proposed values proposed by the non-faulty
processes. In the first and the second cases, this omniscient observer can compute the result in a deterministic way.
Differently, it cannot in the last case. The value that is decided depends then on the behavior of Byzantine processes
(that can favor the most proposed value, or entail a ⊥ decision). These different possibilities are depicted on Figure 6.
As we have seen, a value proposed only by Byzantine processes is necessarily proposed by less then (n−2t) processes
and, consequently, cannot be decided.
7.2 Comparing the previous signature-free multivalued ITB algorithms
Table 2 presents a summary of the cost and the constraint on t associated with the previous signature-free ITB multi-
valued consensus algorithms. As they all use the same underlying BCC algorithm, the comparison does not take this
algorithm into account.
It is easy to see that, due the weaker constraint on t, the algorithm of Figure 5 instantiated with VB-broadcast
outperforms the generic algorithm of Figure 4 instantiated with ND-broadcast. On another side, in a system where the
number of Byzantine processes remains small (i.e., t < n/5), the generic algorithm instantiated UB-broadcast is the
most efficient.
Consensus algorithm # communication message size # msgs constraint
instantiated with steps at send/receive level at send/receive level on t
Generic algorithm with UB 1× 2 constant O(n2) n > 5t
Generic algorithm with ND 2× 2 log2 n O(n3) n > 4t
Specific algorithm based on VB 1× 6 log2 n O(n3) n > 3t
Table 2: Cost of the ITB consensus algorithms
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8 A Randomized VB-Based Byzantine Binary Consensus Algorithm
This section presents a particularly simple randomized Byzantine binary consensus algorithm (that can be used as the
underlying BBC algorithm on which rely the multivalued Byzantine consensus algorithms previously described). The
additional power needed to solve consensus is given here by random coins. This algorithm, which is optimal from a
resilience point of view (t < n/3), is based on the validated broadcast abstraction. More precisely, each round requires
one VB-broadcast instance.
When looking at Byzantine consensus algorithms that are optimal from a resilience point of view (i.e., algorithms
able to cope with up to ⌊(n− 1)/3⌋ faulty processes), the best consensus algorithm we are aware of has rounds made
up of three communication steps [8]. Moreover, this algorithm is based on signatures (public key cryptography). As
far as signature-free algorithms are concerned, the best resilience-optimal algorithm we are aware of, that uses control
information whose size is only O(log2 n), is the one described in [30], which requires five communication steps per
round. The algorithm presented in Figure 7 is signature-free and requires only six communication steps per round.
8.1 Randomized model
Common coin The asynchronous system is equipped with a common coin as defined by Rabin [24], and improved
in [8] in order to get rid of the trusted dealer. Such an oracle is denoted CC. The corresponding enriched –from a
computational power point of view– system model is consequently denoted BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3,CC]. A common
coin can be seen as a global entity that delivers a sequence of random bits b1, b2, . . . , br, . . . to processes (each bit br
has the value 0 or 1, with probability 1/2).
More precisely, this oracle provides the processes with a primitive denoted random() that returns a bit each time
it is called by a process. In addition to being random, this bit has the following global property: the rth invocation of
random() by any non-faulty process pi returns it the bit br. This means that the rth invocations of random() by any
pair of non-faulty processes pi and pj return them br, whatever the times at which each of these invocations occur. It is
important to notice that the network has no access to the common coin, which corresponds to the oblivious scheduler
model [2]. (The reader interested in the implementation of a common coin can consult [2, 8].)
On randomized consensus When using additional computing power provided by random coins, the consensus
termination property can no longer be deterministic. Randomized consensus is defined by C-Validity (Obligation),
C-Agreement, plus the following termination property [4, 24]: Every non-faulty process decides with probability 1.
For round-based algorithms, this termination property can be re-stated as follows:
For any non-faulty process pi: limr→+∞
(
Probability [pi decides by round r]
)
= 1.
8.2 The algorithm
Underlying principles and description of the algorithm In the algorithm described in Figure 7, a process pi
invokes the function bin_propose(vi) where vi is the value it proposes. It decides when it executes the statement
decide(v) (line 08). The design of this algorithm is close to an algorithm proposed in [15]. Its fundamental difference
is that it is resilience-optimal (t < n/3), while the one described in [15] requires t < n/5.
The local variable esti of a process pi keeps its current estimate of the decision value (initially, esti = vi). The
processes proceed by consecutive asynchronous rounds. Thus, the pair (ri, esti) of a non-faulty process pi describes its
current state (ri is pi’s current round number). The first part of the algorithm (lines 01-04) is devoted to communication
occurring during a round. The second part (lines 05-10) defines the management of the local estimate esti and the
decision rule. There is one VB-broadcast instance per round. To distinguish the messages EST() associated with
different VB-broadcast instances, these messages are tagged by their round number, namely EST[r](v) denotes a
round r message carrying the value v. More precisely, we have the following.
• At every round ri, each non-faulty process pi VB-broadcasts EST[ri](esti), and waits until it has VB-delivered
EST[ri](−) from at least n− t processes (lines 02-04).
• In the second part, pi first computes the random number s associated with the current round ri (line 05). Then,
pi checks if (a) it has received a non-⊥ value v from at least n − 2t different processes, and (b) v is the only
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non-⊥ value in reci (predicate at line 06). If this predicate holds, pi adopts v as new estimate (line 07) and
decides the random value s if v = s (line 08). If the predicate is false, pi updates its estimate esti to the random
value s. In all cases, pi starts a new asynchronous round.
The statement decide() allows the invoking process to decide but does not stop its execution. Hence, a process
executes rounds forever. This facilitates the description of the algorithm. Using techniques such as the one developed
in [15] allows a process to both decide and stop.
Remark It is possible to add the following test after line 04:
if (∃v : #equal(v, reci) ≥ n− t) then decide(v) end if.
This allows the algorithm to always terminate in a single round whatever the value of the common coin when no pro-
cess commits Byzantine failure and all processes propose the same value. (This scenario is likely to happen in actual
executions.)
operation bin_propose(vi)
esti ← vi; ri ← 0;
repeat forever
(01) ri ← ri + 1;
(02) VB_broadcast EST[ri](esti);
(03) let reci = multiset of values est such that EST[ri](est) has been VB_delivered to pi;
(04) wait until (|reci| ≥ n− t);
(05) si ← random();
(06) if (∃v 6= ⊥ : #equal(v, reci) ≥ n− 2t) ∧ (reci contains a single non-⊥ value)
(07) then esti ← v;
(08) if (v = s) ∧ (pi has not yet decided) then decide(v) end if
(09) else esti ← s
(10) end if
end repeat.
Figure 7: A binary Byzantine consensus algorithm based on VB-broadcast (t < n/3)
8.3 Proof
Lemma 4. Let n > 3t. Consider the situation where, at the beginning of a round r, all the non-faulty processes have
the same estimate value v. These processes will never change their estimates, thereafter.
Proof As all the non-faulty processes VB-broadcast the same value v at the beginning of round r (line 02), it follows
from the VB-obligation property of VB-broadcast, that the only values that can be VB-delivered are v (VB-broadcast
by each of them and possibly from Byzantine processes) and ⊥ (from Byzantine processes). Moreover, as each non-
faulty process pi waits for n− t messages (line 04), it will VB-deliver at least n− 2t values v; as n > 3t, at most t of
them can be VB-broadcast by Byzantine processes (due to the VB-validity property, a value w 6= v VB-broadcast by a
Byzantine process pj cannot be validated, and consequently ⊥ or no value at all is VB-delivered from such a process
pj). Hence, the predicate of line 06 is satisfied, and pi sets esti to v (line 07), which concludes the proof of the lemma.
✷Lemma 4
Let COND(v , i) be the predicate that process pi tests at line 06.
Lemma 5. Let n > 3t. If two non-faulty processes pi and pj are such that both COND(v , i) and COND(w , j ) hold
at round r, then v = w.
Proof By the VB-Uniformity property of VB-broadcast, no two non-faulty processes VB-deliver different values from
the same process. Hence, if COND(v , i) holds for some non-faulty process pi, no other non-faulty process pj can
VB-deliver a value w 6= v from the set of (n− t) processes whose VB-broadcasts built the set reci. Consequently, if
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pj VB-delivers a value w 6= v, the number of occurrences of w is necessarily at most t < n − 2t, and consequently
COND(w , j ) cannot be satisfied. ✷Lemma 5
Lemma 6. Let n > 3t. If all the non-faulty processes propose the same value v, then no value v′ 6= v can be decided.
Proof This lemma is an immediate consequence of Lemma 4. As all estimates of the non-faulty processes remain
equal to v, it follows from line 08 that no value v′ 6= v can be returned by a non-faulty process. ✷Lemma 6
Lemma 7. No two non-faulty processes decide different values.
Proof Let r be the first round during which non-faulty processes decide. If two processes pi and pj decide at round
r, they decide at line 08 the value s computed by the common coin for that round. Moreover, before deciding during
round r, a process updated its estimate to the decided value s. Hence, all processes that decide during round r decide
the same value s, and have their estimates equal to the decided value.
Let us now consider the case of a a processes px for which, during round r, (a) the predicate of line 06 is satisfied
(i.e., COND(w , x ) is true), (b) while the decision predicate at line 08 is not. As the predicate of line 06 is satisfied for
both px and any process pi that decides at line 08 (i.e., both COND(w , x ) and COND(i , v) are true), it follows from
Lemma 5 that w = v, which means that it is not possible that the decision predicate of px be false. Hence, px decides
during round r, exactly as pi.
Let us finally consider the case of a non-faulty process pk such that COND(−, k) does not hold at line 06 during
round r. It follows from line 09 that pk updates its estimate to the random value s associated with round r. Hence, all
such processes pk start round r + 1 with their estimates equal to the decided value s.
It then follows from Lemma 4 that, from round r+1, the estimates of all the non-faulty processes keep forever the
same value (namely, the decided value). Hence, no value different from this estimate value can be decided. ✷Lemma 7
Lemma 8. Each non-faulty process decides with probability 1.
Proof No non-faulty process remains blocked forever during a round r. This follows from the fact that, at every
round, a non-faulty process pi waits for the VB-delivery of a message EST(r,−) from n− t distinct processes, and at
every round each non-faulty process VB-broadcasts such a message that (due to the VB-Termination property) entails
a corresponding VB-delivery at each non-faulty process.
Claim. With probability 1, there is a round r at the end of which all the non-faulty processes have the same estimate
value. (End of the claim.)
Assuming the claim holds, it follows from Lemma 4 that all the non-faulty processes pi keep their estimate value
esti = v and consequently the predicate COND(v , i) (line 06) is true at every round. Due to common coin CC,
it follows that, with probability 1, there is eventually a round in which random() outputs v. Then, the condition of
line 08 evaluates to true, and all the non-faulty processes decide.
Proof of the claim. We need to prove that, with probability 1, there is a round at the end of which all the non-faulty
processes have the same estimate value. Let us consider a round r.
• Observe that if all the non-faulty processes execute line 09 then, at the end of r, they all adopt the same value
(defined by the common coin) by the end of r. The claim directly follows.
• If all the non-faulty processes execute line 07, due to Lemma 5 they adopt the same value v as their estimate,
and the claim follows.
• The third case is when some non-faulty processes execute line 07 and (by Lemma 5) adopt the same value v,
while others execute line 09 and adopt the same value s.
Due to the properties of the common coin, the value it computes at a given round is independent from the values
it computes at the other rounds (and also from the Byzantine behavior and the network scheduler). Thus, s is
equal to v with probability p = 1/2. Let P (r) be the following probability (where varr is the value of var at
round r): P (r) = Probability[∃r′ : r′ ≤ r : vr′ = sr′ ]. We have P (r) = p+ (1− p)p+ · · ·+ (1− p)r−1p. So,
P (r) = 1− (1− p)r. As limr→+∞ P (r) = 1, the claim follows. (End of the proof of the claim.)
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✷Lemma 8
Theorem 6. The algorithm described in Figure 7 solves the randomized binary consensus problem in the system model
BZ_ASn,t[t < n/3,VB,CC].
Proof Follows from lemmas 6, 7 and 8.
✷Theorem 6
Theorem 7. Let n > 3t. The expected decision time is constant.
Proof As indicated in the proof of Lemma 8, termination is obtained in two phases. First, all the non-faulty processes
must adopt the same value v. Second, the outcome of the common coin has to be the same as the commonly adopted
value v.
It follows from the proof of Lemma 8 that there is only one situation in which the non-faulty processes do not
adopt the same value. This is when the predicate of line 06 is satisfied for a subset of non-faulty processes and not for
the other non-faulty processes. Thus, the expected number of rounds for this to happen is 2. As for the second phase,
here again, the probability that the value output by the common coin is the same as the value held by all the non-
faulty processes is 1/2. Thus, the expected time for this to occur is also 2. Combining the two phases, the expected
termination time is 4 rounds (i.e., a small constant). ✷Theorem 7
9 Conclusion
Considering distributed message-passing systems made up of n processes, and where up to t processes may com-
mit Byzantine failures, the aim of the paper was to present in a simple and homogeneous way (a) existing and new
broadcast and agreement abstractions, and (b) algorithms implementing them. These broadcast abstractions are UB-
broadcast (unreliable broadcast), ND-broadcast (no-duplicity broadcast), RB-broadcast (reliable broadcast), and VB-
broadcast (validated broadcast). They have been used to design three multivalued intrusion-tolerant Byzantine consen-
sus algorithms. Moreover, all these algorithms are signature-free. As we have seen, the intrusion-tolerance property
means that no value proposed only by Byzantine processes can ever be decided. As a consequence, a default value can
be decided when the same value is not proposed by enough processes1.
The intrusion-tolerant consensus algorithm based on VB-broadcast has several noteworthy features: it is optimal
from a resilience point of view (t < n/3), each round requires only a single VB-broadcast instance, which costs six
communication steps, and the size of control information attached with each message is O(log2 n). The paper has also
presented a novel randomized binary Byzantine consensus algorithm that is resilient-optimal and, in a very interesting
way, is also based on the VB-broadcast abstraction. Let us finally notice that an important feature of the paper lies in
its “partial survey” flavor.
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